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Abstract	
David	Miller’s	Strangers	in	our	Midst	is	an	important	contribution	to	the	debate	among	
political	philosophers	about	how	liberal	democratic	states	should	deal	with	the	issue	of	
migration.	But	it	is	also	a	thoughtful	statement	concerning	how	best	to	do	political	
philosophy	and,	as	such,	contributes	also	to	the	growing	debate	within	Anglo-American	
political	theory	about	the	relative	merits	of	‘ideal’	versus	‘non-ideal’	normative	theorising.	
Miller’s	argument	in	the	book	builds	on	his	earlier	published	work	in	suggesting	that	political	
philosophy	should	be	‘for	Earthlings’:	it	should	not	be	understood	as	a	process	of	ideal	
theorising	which	ignores	political	reality.	He	argues	that	normative	theorists	should	seek	to	
resolve	complex	political	problems	by	taking	seriously	the	political	context	that	makes	these	
problems	complex,	rather	than	putting	aside	that	context	in	the	interests	of	deriving	first	
principles.	This	is	a	controversial	approach,	which	requires	political	philosophers	to	take	
more	seriously	than	they	often	do	the	expressed	concerns	of	citizens	living	in	democratic	
states	and	the	practical	problems	associated	with	applying	normative	principles	in	ways	
which	actually	help	address	the	issue	at	hand.	This	piece	discusses	some	of	these	themes,	
and	the	issue	of	migration	more	generally,	in	order	to	help	frame	the	debate	which	follows.	
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In	the	time	that	it	takes	you	to	read	the	articles	in	this	special	section	on	David	Miller’s	
Strangers	in	our	Midst,	assuming	that	it	takes	you	around	four	hours,	around	6000	men,	
women,	and	children	across	the	world	will	have	been	forced	to	flee	their	homes	for	fear	of	
violence.	That	is	around	1440	people	per	hour,	or	24	people	a	minute,	or,	if	you	prefer,	4	
people	in	the	time	it	took	you	to	read	that	first	sentence.	21.3m	people	were	registered	as	
refugees	by	the	UN	in	2015,	although	the	number	of	people	seeking	refuge	in	countries	
other	than	their	own	has	been	estimated	to	be	much	higher	(UNHCR,	2016).	Of	those	that	
we	know	about,	4.9m	crossed	one	of	Syria’s	borders	in	the	hope	of	escaping	the	brutal	civil	
war	that	has	devastated	the	region	and	left	12%	of	its	citizen	population	dead	or	injured	
(United	Nations,	2015).	Many	others	who	left	or	tried	to	leave	will	not	show	up	in	this	
figure.	Some	will	have	destroyed	their	papers	on	the	way	for	fear	of	being	turned	back.	
Others	will	have	paid	people	smugglers	for	the	opportunity	to	cram	themselves	and	their	
families	onto	boats	for	illegal	passage	from	Turkey	to	Greece.	Others	will	have	taken	a	
different	way	out,	perhaps	travelling	on	foot	through	central	Europe	to	Germany	from	
Turkey,	or	joining	with	refugees	fleeing	from	Eritrea	and	Afghanistan	on	smuggling	routes	
across	the	Sahara	through	Jordan,	Egypt,	and	Libya	and	then,	eventually,	to	Italy	or	Malta.	
8,000	people	a	day	–	1350	in	the	four	hours	that	it	takes	you	to	read	these	articles	–	will	
reach	Europe’s	borders.	Many	will	face	uncertain	futures	in	crowded	camps	or	hostels.	
Many	others	will	be	deported.	Many	hundreds	will	be	intercepted	in	the	Aegean	or	
Mediterranean,	or	end	their	journeys	at	the	newly	fortified	razor	wire	fences	erected	along	
the	borders	of	gateway	countries	like	Macedonia	and	Hungary.	Many	thousands	will	not	
survive.	Over	a	million	men,	women,	and	children	were	estimated	to	have	attempted	the	
journey	to	Europe	over	the	Mediterranean	in	2015.	Of	these,	3,770	are	known	to	have	died	
(Crawley	et	al,	2015).	Of	the	4.9m	Syrian	refugees	that	were	registered	as	of	2015,	just	
under	2.4m	are	aged	18	or	under.	Over	800,000	are	younger	than	four	years	old.	Over	
98,000	of	those	children	currently	living	in	Europe’s	refugee	camps	made	the	journey	alone	
or	were	separated	from	their	parents	on	the	way,	either	because	they	were	killed,	or	
because	they	disappeared	one	day	and	never	came	back,	or	because	they	could	only	afford	
one	place	on	the	boat,	or	inside	the	storage	container,	that	would	take	them	away	(United	
Nations,	2015).	
	
In	addition	to	the	refugees	who	have	crossed	one	of	Syria’s	borders,	are	those	people	
whose	futures	arguably	look	bleakest	of	all:	those	who	have	been	forced	to	flee	their	homes	
by	the	violence	but	have	crossed	no	border;	those	who	have	grabbed	what	they	can	and	
left.	Many	will	be	caught	and	either	murdered	or	imprisoned	by	the	forces	that	they	are	
running	from,	perhaps	today	or	perhaps	after	weeks	or	months	of	fleeing	across	landscape	
that	can	see	day	time	temperatures	of	over	40	degrees	Celsius	plummet	to	less	than	zero	at	
night.	Many	will	succumb	to	starvation,	thirst,	disease,	or	exposure.	There	are	currently	
around	8m	of	these	internally	displaced	people	in	Syria	alone.	The	total	number	of	people	in	
the	world	running	for	their	lives	in	this	way,	in	Syria	and	Iraq,	the	Congo,	Burundi,	South	
Sudan,	Nigeria,	Ukraine,	Colombia	and	beyond	currently	stands	at	around	38m.	The	total	
number	of	people	who	have	been	forcibly	displaced	currently	stands	at	just	over	65m,	
which	is	to	say	1	in	every	113	human	beings	on	Earth.	This	number	grows	by	34,000	a	day.	
Over	half	are	aged	18	or	under	(United	Nations,	2015).	
	
Meanwhile,	throughout	the	world,	economic	migrants	in	search	of	a	better	life	are	seeking	
passage	from	their	own	countries	to	more	prosperous	ones.	Around	180m	people	did	so	in	
2015.	Many	travel	legally.	Many	others	do	so	illegally.	The	illegal	smuggling	of	migrants	
across	the	world’s	two	largest	trafficking	routes	alone	–	the	US/Mexico	border	and	the	
route	from	Africa	to	Europe	–	generates	an	annual	income	of	$6.7b	for	criminal	
organisations,	much	of	which	ends	up	funding	the	illegal	trafficking	of	drugs	and	human	
beings	for	the	purposes	of	organ	harvesting	or	slavery.	This	despite	border	enforcement	
initiatives	in	the	US	that	have	transformed	the	US/Mexico	border	region	‘into	a	militarized	
zone	where	the	US	constitution	and	international	law	are	selectively	applied’	and	in	which	
authorities	practice	the	‘systemic	violation	of	the	civil	and	human	rights	of	border	crossers	
and	those	living	in	border	communities’	(Border	Network	for	Human	Rights,	2008;	p.	8).	
Many	thousands	of	economic	migrants	seeking	illegal	passage	into	the	US,	the	nations	of	
Europe,	and	elsewhere	do	not	survive	their	journeys.	Many	thousands	more	will	be	
repatriated.	Many	thousands	of	those	who	make	it	through	will	live	exploited,	poor,	and	
isolated	lives	on	the	margins	of	the	societies	in	which	they	now	reside.		
	
How	should	individuals	and	governments	respond	to	statistics	such	as	these?	The	scale	of	
the	problem	seems	to	require	urgent	action.	But	what	kind	of	action?	And	by	whom?	Public	
attitudes	toward	immigration	have	changed	over	the	past	three	decades,	and	immigration	
policies	throughout	the	world,	and	particularly	in	Europe,	have	changed	too.	The	1990s	and	
2000s	saw	an	increased	willingness	among	many	states	to	welcome	immigrants	and	to	
recognise	and	even	celebrate	the	diversity	that	increased	immigration	created.	The	
relaxation	of	border	controls	among	member	states	of	the	EU,	for	example,	and	the	
increased	adoption	of	multiculturalist	policies	aimed	at	the	recognition	of	minority	identities	
in	states	like	Britain,	Holland,	Denmark,	and	Germany	formalised	a	growing	positivity	among	
policy	makers	and	citizens	about	the	economic	and	cultural	benefits	that	increased	
migration	could	bring.	As	the	EU	expanded,	however,	and	as	citizens	of	European	states	
became	increasingly	concerned	about	Islamic	terrorism	and	other	perceived	external	
threats,	enthusiasm	for	free	movement	among	the	original	member	states	began	to	decline	
(Parvin,	2009).	The	relaxation	of	border	controls	within	Europe	has,	according	to	many	of	
Europe’s	citizens	and	governments,	led	to	an	untenable	influx	of	migrants	into	the	more	
prosperous	nations.	Migration	on	this	scale,	they	have	said,	jeopardises	national	identity,	
undermines	social	unity,	and	affords	unfair	advantages	to	foreign	nationals.	The	current	
refugee	crisis	only	exacerbates	these	concerns,	and	exerts	greater	pressures	on	an	already	
struggling	international	system,	they	suggest.		
	
The	fact	that	immigration	has	become	a	significant	concern	among	citizens	of	liberal	
democratic	states	has	thrust	it	to	the	foreground	of	contemporary	global	and	domestic	
politics.	It	dominated	the	2015	elections	in	the	UK	and	France,	for	example,	and	is	currently	
figuring	highly	in	the	current	US	Presidential	campaign.	It	also	played	a	profound	role	in	
motivating	many	British	citizens	to	vote	to	leave	the	EU	in	the	2015	referendum,	with	
concerns	about	immigration	and	a	perceived	lack	of	control	over	Britain’s	borders	being	
among	the	most	common	reasons	given	for	rejecting	the	EU.	Switzerland	and	Poland	have	
recently	elected	anti-immigration	governments,	the	National	Front	in	France	remains	strong	
despite	their	failure	to	make	the	electoral	breakthroughs	that	many	predicted,	and	indeed	
appears	to	be	growing	in	popularity	among	French	voters	in	the	wake	of	recent	Islamist	
terror	attacks.	British	politics	already	looks	to	have	shifted	to	the	right	in	the	wake	of	the	
referendum	vote,	with	hostility	to	immigrants	and	racial	violence	showing	marked	increases.	
Immigration	policies	have	seen	significant	tightening	across	the	world,	and	attitudes	toward	
cultural,	ethnic,	and	religious	diversity	in	many	states	have	hardened.	Belgium,	France,	and	
Holland	have	passed	stringent	laws	outlawing	the	public	wearing	of	certain	forms	of	
religious	dress	at	the	same	time	as	strengthening	their	borders	against	non	co-nationals.	
Similar	laws	look	likely	to	be	implemented	in	Norway,	Denmark,	and	Austria,	and	have	been	
discussed	in	England.	If	the	1990s	and	2000s	saw	multiculturalism	emerge	as	a	dominant	
force	among	European	states,	the	past	decade	has	seen	those	same	states	reverse	their	
position,	calling	for	the	strengthening	of	border	controls	and	policies	which	emphasise	unity	
over	diversity,	and	prioritise	opportunities	for	co-nationals	over	foreigners.	
	
The	movement	of	peoples	across	borders,	and	within	them,	is	thus	an	issue	which	raises	
profound	and	enduring	questions	for	political	theory	and	practice.	At	the	level	of	theory,	it	
questions	the	demands	of	justice	on	the	global	and	domestic	stage,	the	character	and	
origins	of	our	moral	obligations,	and	the	means	by	which	the	competing	interests	at	stake	in	
questions	concerning	state	sovereignty,	rights,	and	national	identity	are	identified	and	
balanced.	It	also	dramatizes	a	stark	and	enduring	tension	between	the	requirements	of	
justice	and	the	requirements	of	democracy.	Many	political	theorists	have	argued	that	justice	
requires	the	loosening	of	border	controls	and	the	greater	accommodation	of	migrants	by	
Western	liberal	democratic	states.	But	what	if	the	expressed	democratic	will	of	the	citizens	
of	these	states	is	to	impose	stricter	limits	on	immigration	and	to	emphasise	shared	values	
over	the	values	of	minorities,	as	it	seems	to	be?	Should	not	their	democratically	elected	
governments	take	this	fact	seriously	and	act	on	it?	How	should	the	expressed	will	of	citizens	
figure	in	our	normative	theorising	about	migration,	if	at	all?		
	
The	question	raises	at	least	two	fundamental	methodological	questions	about	the	
appropriate	conduct	of	political	philosophy	itself.	The	first	concerns	the	extent	to	which	
normative	theorising	should	be	anchored	in	the	lived	reality	of	contemporary	political	
practice.	How	far	from	the	lived	experience	of	real	people	should	political	theorists	retreat	
in	order	to	determine	normative	solutions	to	problems	like	the	refugee	crisis,	people	
smuggling,	the	exploitation	and	death	of	boat	people,	or	the	lengths	that	the	world’s	poor	
will	go	to	in	order	to	better	their	lives	in	another	country?	Some	distance	seems	necessary.	
We	need	to	inhabit	a	theoretical	space	in	which	we	can	reflect	upon	how	the	local	affects	
the	universal,	what	the	lived	experience	of	particular	people	in	a	particular	place	says,	if	
anything,	about	the	way	we	should	treat	all	people	in	all	places.	But	too	much	distance	risks	
eviscerating	the	process	of	the	very	human	experience	which	drives	the	search	for	answers.	
Deep	tragedy	of	the	kind	that	we	see	played	out	in	the	icy	waters	of	the	Mediterranean,	the	
bombed	streets	of	Aleppo,	or	the	burned	villages	of	North	East	Nigeria	tests	the	veracity	and	
limits	of	political	philosophy.	The	more	obvious	and	stark	the	tragedy,	the	more	is	at	stake	in	
the	ongoing	debate	among	ideal	and	non-ideal	theorists,	or	among	moralists	and	realists,	
about	the	appropriate	conduct	and	subject	matter	of	political	theory	(Valentini,	2012;	Rossi	
&	Sleat,	2014).		
	
The	second,	and	connected,	methodological	question	concerns	the	principal	task	of	
normative	theorising.	What	is	the	central	purpose	of	normative	political	theory?	One	
answer,	especially	common	among	liberals	working	in	the	Rawlsian	tradition,	is	that	it	is	to	
determine	a	just	distribution	of	scarce	resources	among	individuals	assumed	to	be	free	and	
equal.	If	this	is	the	task	of	political	philosophy,	it	is	not	surprising	that	many	political	
philosophers	have	been	persuaded	of	the	case	for	open	borders.	Immigration	enforcement	
is	expensive	and	violates	the	liberal	principle	of	equal	opportunity,	they	have	argued.	It	is	
therefore	a	colossal	and	unjust	misuse	of	scarce	public	resources.	The	UK	spent	£1.8b	on	
immigration	enforcement	last	year.	The	US	spent	$18b.	On	top	of	the	money	spent	by	
individual	member	states,	the	2016	budget	allocated	to	the	EU’s	Regional	Task	Force,	in	
charge	of	policing	the	EU’s	external	borders,	patrolling	Europe’s	oceans,	and	screening	
applicants,	stands	at	€200m.	This,	they	say,	is	a	lot	of	money	that	could	and	should	be	spent	
on	other	things	more	consistent	with	principles	of	social	justice.	
	
Another	answer,	however,	is	that	it	is	an	important	role	of	normative	theory	to	seek	to	
protect	common	forms	of	identity,	whether	cultural,	national,	civic,	or	religious,	and	that	
questions	of	distribution	cannot	be	disentangled	from	wider	questions	about	the	nature,	
character,	and	integrity	of	the	communities	within	which	redistribution	takes	place	
(Kymlicka,	1996;	Miller,	1997).	Such	a	view	makes	greater	space	for	the	need	to	protect	the	
borders	between	groups	of	one	kind	or	another,	and	to	take	seriously	the	importance	of	
these	communities	both	for	justice	and	for	the	wellbeing	of	those	who	belong	to	them.	
Defenders	of	such	a	view	may	debate	the	figures	involved,	and	the	relative	importance	of	
different	communities,	but	they	tend	to	be	more	critical	of	the	principled	claim	made	by	
many	cosmopolitan	liberals	that	the	protection	of	borders	is	necessarily	an	unjust	use	of	
scarce	resources.	
	
These	methodological	questions,	and	the	diverse	ways	in	which	they	have	been	answered	
by	political	theorists	and	others,	at	least	partly	explains	the	disconnect	between	the	general	
trajectory	of	contemporary	political	philosophy	and	that	of	public	opinion	on	matters	of	
immigration,	and	also	between	David	Miller	and	many	of	his	peers	on	this	issue.	While	the	
tide	of	public	opinion	is	turning	toward	greater	control	of	borders,	stricter	rules,	and	a	
reduction	in	numbers,	a	significant	number	of	political	theorists	have	gone	in	the	opposite	
direction.	Despite	some	concerns	among	certain	social	democrats	and	other	progressive	
liberals	about	the	challenges	to	egalitarian	politics	and	social	justice	posed	by	immigration	
and	diversity	(Barry,	2001;	Blake,	2013;	Wellman,	2008),	the	burgeoning	literature	on	the	
political	philosophy	of	migration	is	arguably	characterised	by	a	growing	agreement	among	
many	egalitarian	and	libertarian	political	philosophers	on	the	need	for	the	relaxation	of	
border	controls	or	even	the	abolition	of	all	such	controls	(Abizadeh,	2010;	Brennan,	2014;	
Carens,	2015).	Miller’s	position	on	immigration,	like	his	position	on	national	identity	and	
global	justice,	thus	stands	at	odds	with	that	of	many	political	theorists	working	in	the	Anglo-
American	tradition.	He	ends	up	in	a	different	place	because	he	begins	in	a	different	place:	
his	answer	to	the	methodological	questions	posed	above	differ	from	that	employed	by	
many	of	his	peers.		
	
Indeed,	Strangers	in	our	Midst	is	arguably	as	much	a	book	about	political	philosophy,	and	
about	how	to	do	political	philosophy,	as	it	is	a	book	about	migration.	For	‘strong’	
cosmopolitans	the	principal	task	of	political	philosophy	is	to	derive	regulative	first	principles	
of	justice	which	can	be	justified	by	a	process	of	reasoned	theorising	which	does	not,	as	
much	as	possible,	make	reference	to,	or	ground	itself	in,	the	lived	experiences	or	expressed	
ideas	of	individuals	in	the	real	world	(Barry,	1999;	Beitz,	1979).	Such	experiences	are	
bracketed	off	for	the	purposes	of	justifying	principles	on	terms	that	all	rational	individuals	
could	accept	regardless	of	their	particular	experiences,	ideas,	or	values.	Feasibility	
constraints	such	as	non-compliance,	the	expressed	views	of	actually-existing	people,	the	
complexity	introduced	by	contemporary	global	and	domestic	institutional	regimes,	and	the	
absence	of	just	background	conditions	are	also	put	aside	in	order	that	they	do	not	unduly	
clutter	the	search	for	first	principles.	Grand	theorising	of	this	kind	tends	to	produce	
principles	which	are	(a)	universal	in	scope,	but	(b)	politically	unfeasible.	This	is	not	
surprising.	Principles	derived	in	abstraction	from	empirical	circumstances	and	the	expressed	
ideals	of	the	people	involved	may	apply	readily	to	the	world	as	it	currently	is	and	may	offer	
solutions	which	feed	into	public	policy	debates	about	problems	in	this	world,	but	this	would	
be	coincidental.	That	that	they	do	or	do	not	do	so	does	not	influence	their	defensibility.	The	
defensibility	of	such	principles	is	judged	independently	of	such	contingent	factors	as	what	
actual	people	currently	think	or	how	global	politics	is	currently	configured	and,	hence,	they	
more	often	than	not	call	for	the	radical	reconstruction	of	domestic	and	global	politics,	
ignore	the	expressed	views	of	actual	people,	and	reject	many	of	the	most	fundamental	
assumptions	that	shape	the	conduct	of	politics	in	the	contemporary	age.	
	
Miller’s	approach,	on	the	contrary,	is	to	seek	normative	principles	which	are	at	least	partly	
grounded	in	lived	experiences	and	values	and	which,	therefore,	produce	outcomes	which	
are	anchored	to	some	extent	in	the	real	world	and	which	speak	to	policy	debates.	His	aim	is	
to	question	existing	political	and	institutional	arrangements,	but	to	do	so	in	a	way	that	
‘throws	light	on	our	predicament’	instead	of	imagining	radical	and	unworkable	utopias	
(Miller,	2016).	Such	an	approach,	he	believes,	is	both	realistic	and	political,	rather	than	
ethical.	He	is	not	interested	in	making	the	problems	associated	with	migration	disappear	by,	
for	example,	proposing	a	stateless	world,	or	presupposing	background	conditions	of	perfect	
justice,	as	strong	cosmopolitan	thinkers	are	more	likely	to	do	(Miller,	2016,	pp	157	–	159).	
He	is	also	not	primarily	concerned	to	‘tell	people	how	to	behave’	(Miller,	2016,	p.	18).	
Instead,	he	seeks	to	resolve	the	questions	about	immigration	raised	by	the	empirical	
evidence	through	public	policy	and	institutional	reform.	His	is	not	a	Rawlsian	project	in	ideal	
theory	but	rather	one	which	grapples	with	the	pressures	exerted	by	non-ideal	political	
forces	and	social	facts;	one	in	which	normative	conclusions	take	seriously	the	expressed	
values	and	concerns	of	the	people	who	are	going	to	be	affected	by	these	conclusions	if	they	
were	to	be	acted	upon,	in	a	specific	empirical	context	at	a	specific	moment	in	time.	
	
This	method	has	important	implications.	If	we	can	agree	that	human	experience	matters	to	
our	normative	theorising	and,	in	particular,	that	the	experiences	and	concerns	of	migrants	
have	an	important	role	in	shaping	our	normative	conclusions	about	what	is	at	stake	in	this	
issue,	then	it	suggests	that	the	experiences	and	concerns	of	non-migrants	should	matter	in	
our	theorising	too.	If	the	process	of	normative	theorising	is	appropriately	influenced	by	the	
felt	needs	of	people	who	exist	in	the	world	and	not	conducted	from	a	standpoint	of	pure	
reason	which	abstracts	itself	from	these	people	and	their	experiences,	then	it	becomes	an	
important	task	of	political	theory	to	weigh	competing	concerns	rather	than	to	derive	
abstract	rules	independently	of	them.	Miller	has	long	believed	that	political	theorising	
should	take	more	account	of	the	values	and	concerns	of	its	subjects	than	is	customary	
among	those	who	follow	the	Rawlsian	method.	In	his	words,	justice	should	be	for	Earthlings	
(Miller,	2013).	Hence,	for	Miller,	the	fact	that	many	people	in	the	world	claim	to	have	a	
national	identity	that	at	least	partly	shapes	their	sense	of	self	is	important	and	carries	some	
normative	weight.	Similarly,	the	fact	that	many	people	in	the	world	express	a	concern	about	
migration	also	carries	normative	weight	and	needs	to	be	considered.	The	fact	that	
arguments	for	open	borders	are	very	unpopular	among	many	citizens	of	liberal	democratic	
states	does	not,	for	Miller,	represent	merely	a	practical	problem	of	feasibility	(although	it	
does	do	this).	It	is	undermines	their	philosophical	persuasiveness.	Normative	theories	must	
work,	or	at	least	have	some	chance	of	working,	in	the	world	as	it	is	currently	configured,	
given	the	way	people	currently	act.	In	a	democratic	state,	immigration	policies	must	be	
acceptable	to	their	citizens.	Justice	for	Miller	needs	to	be	realistic	in	the	sense	that	it	needs	
to	accord	with	overarching,	widespread	ideas	shared	among	the	people	to	whom	it	will	
apply	as	well	as	being	practically	achievable.	
	
Does	Miller’s	approach	lack	ambition?	Certainly,	on	the	face	of	it	‘strong’	cosmopolitanism	
appears	to	embody	a	courage	that	the	Miller’s	‘weak’	cosmopolitanism	seems	to	lack:	a	
determination	to	tackle	the	biggest,	most	fundamental	questions	of	all	and,	often,	to	
recommend	solutions	which	reject	popular	opinion	and	contemporary	political	practice	in	
favour	of	the	radical	reconfiguration	of	our	politics	and	the	assumptions	upon	which	they	
are	based.	But	while	this	approach	may	appear	courageous,	it	actually	ducks	the	issue.	
Bracketing	off	all	the	messy	and	complex	aspects	of	a	problem	actually	makes	the	process	of	
normative	theorising	about	that	problem	easier,	not	harder.	It	removes,	or	radically	alters	or	
diminishes,	the	problem.	So	while	some	political	theorists	may	be	satisfied	with	a	solution	
grounded	in	the	radical	recalibration	of	global	political	institutions	and	processes,	
governments	and	policy	makers	actually	tasked	with	the	responsibility	of	dealing	with	the	
issue	in	this	world	at	this	time	will	not.	In	a	complex	world	characterised	by	domestic	and	
international	pressures,	in	which	policy	decisions	need	to	be	negotiated	and	implemented	in	
a	process	involving	countless	state	and	non-state	actors	of	different	kinds	and	of	different	
sizes	with	different	jurisdictions,	in	a	wide	political	context	defined	by	long-standing	multi-
lateral	agreements,	formal	and	informal	relations,	and	a	rigid	system	of	international	law	
administered	by	countless	large	and	small	institutions	throughout	the	world,	the	suggestion	
that	we	solve	the	issue	of	migration	by,	for	example,	removing	all	borders	and	establishing	
institutions	which	support	the	global	free	movement	of	peoples	seems	at	best	unhelpful	
and	at	worst	self-indulgent.		
	
Miller’s	approach	is	to	occupy	a	position	sufficiently	removed	from	lived	reality	to	allow	the	
practice	of	normative	theorising	to	take	place,	but	not	so	removed	as	to	uncouple	this	
practice	from	the	real	world	entirely.	For	some,	he	will	admit	too	much	of	the	real	world.	
These	people	are	likely	to	be	troubled	by	Miller’s	rejection	of	open	borders,	his	defence	of	
compatriot	partiality,	his	claim	that	a	state’s	immigration	policy	should	be	at	least	partly	
shaped	by	the	democratic	will	of	the	people	of	that	state	and	not	derived	entirely	from	first	
principles,	and	his	claim	that	economic	migrants	cannot	claim	an	automatic	right	to	
admission	on	the	basis	of	justice.	Others	will	think	that	he	admits	too	little.	These	people	are	
more	likely	to	dislike	Miller’s	call	for	a	much	stronger	commitment	to	accommodating	
refugees	and	to	respecting	the	basic	human	rights	of	would-be	immigrants	than	is	
consistent	with	the	overarching	tenor	of	discussions	among	many	governments	and	their	
publics	at	the	present	time.	Miller’s	Strangers	in	our	Midst	will	therefore	prove	controversial	
to	almost	everyone	who	reads	it,	inside	and	outside	of	academia.	This	is	only	fitting.	As	the	
pieces	in	this	special	section	of	CRISPP	show,	Miller’s	attempt	to	produce	normative	
conclusions	which	are	anchored	at	least	partly	in	the	actual	views	that	real	people	have,	and	
which	seek	to	provide	philosophically	rigorous	solutions	to	concrete	problems	experienced	
by	actually-existing	states	poses	a	challenge	to	both	widespread	public	opinion	and	also	to	
many	political	philosophers	working	in	the	Anglo-American	tradition.	In	doing	so,	it	forces	
political	philosophers	to	think	again	not	only	about	the	issue	of	migration,	but	about	the	
nature	and	purpose	of	political	philosophy	itself.**	
	
Dr	Phil	Parvin	is	a	Senior	Lecturer	in	Politics	at	Loughborough	University.		
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*	Email:	p.parvin@lboro.ac.uk	
**	The	essays	in	this	special	section	of	CRISPP	began	life	as	papers	presented	at	two	separate	
events	devoted	to	discussing	David	Miller’s	latest	contribution	to	the	debate	about	
immigration	and	political	theory.	The	first	was	a	roundtable	session	at	the	2016	Britain	and	
Ireland	Association	for	Political	Thought	conference	held	at	St	Catherine’s	College,	Oxford,	
8th	January	2016.	The	session	was	Chaired	by	myself,	and	comprised	shorter	versions	of	the	
papers	included	in	this	volume	by	David	Miller,	Sarah	Fine,	Chandran	Kukathas,	and	David	
Owen.	The	second	event	was	a	workshop	held	at	the	Institute	for	Philosophy,	Hamburg	
University,	18th	March	2016,	organised	by	Thomas	Schramme	and	Christine	Straehl,	
comprising	papers	by	David	Miller,	David	Owen,	Oliviero	Angeli,	Eszter	Kollar,	and	Christine	
Straehl.	I	should	like	to	thank	all	these	contributors,	and	those	who	provided	anonymous	
peer	review,	for	their	assistance	in	organising	this	CRISPP	special	section.	I	should	also	like	
to	thank	Richard	Bellamy	for	the	initial	invitation,	and	Christine	Straehl	for	co-organising.	
																																																						
